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Contract scholars debate the relative merits of specific performance and
damages, but few studies assess remedies from an empirical perspective.
This article examines the stock market response to an unusual specific per-
formance award granted to IBP, Inc. in material adverse change (MAC)
clause litigation against Tyson Foods, Inc. The combined value of Tyson and
IBP rose after specific performance was granted, implying that specific per-
formance created value. This result contrasts with other papers indirectly
showing large decreases in combined market value after damages remedies
are awarded. These results suggest that, from a postbreach perspective, the
common law's preference for damages may be misplaced. The article iden-
tifies a number of settings, such as certain types of MAC clause controver-
sies, wherein the use of specific performance rather than damages should
be encouraged.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the appropriate remedy for breach of contract?1 Although the
common law favors a money damages remedy,2 several scholars advocate the
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'Some of the many articles discussing this issue include William Bishop, The Choice of Remedy
for Breach of Contract, 14J. Legal Stud. 299 (1985); Lewis Kornhauser, An Introduction to the
Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 683, 711-17 (1986); Anthony T.
Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 351 (1978); Paul Mahoney, Contract Reme-
dies and Options Pricing, 24J. Legal Stud. 139 (1995); Timothy Muris, The Costs of Freely
Granting Specific Performance, Duke L.J. 1053 (1982); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific
Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271 (1979); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance:
Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 341 (1984); Edward Yorio, In
Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1365 (1982).
2See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897) (stating
that "the duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages
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use of specific performance in many circumstances.3 Reflecting these
pro-specific-performance views, the revised Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) enables specific performance to be stipulated by agreement of the
parties.4
Clearly, the "right" remedy for breach of contract is not an obvious one.
Both damages and specific performance offer several advantages and short-
comings with respect to each other. Specific performance ensures that the
promisee receives the full benefit of his or her bargain and that promisors
do not breach opportunistically, hoping for damages below the cost of per-
formance. When performance is efficient and damages fall short of the costs
of performance, then either the performance fails to occur (underperfor-
mance) or the parties must engage in costly bargaining to bring efficient
performance to fruition. A specific performance remedy when breach is
efficient, however, necessitates costly bargaining to arrive at efficient
nonperformance. If bargaining fails, then specific performance causes
overperformance. The relative importance of these two concerns-the ten-
dency for underperformance arising from money damages versus increased
renegotiation costs and potential for overperformance with specific per-
formance-determine whether specific performance or damages should be
the generally preferred remedy.
Given the importance of remedies for contract law, some information
regarding the relative size of the two conflicting effects is much needed.
Sadly, almost none exists. Little is known about whether specific perform-
ance or damage remedies are typically chosen in an efficient manner.
This article offers empirical evidence about the ex-post efficiency of a
specific performance award. In the beginning of 2001, Tyson (the largest
chicken company in the United States) agreed to acquire IBP (the largest
if you do not keep it-and nothing else"). See also UCC § 2-716 (2005) (limiting the applica-
tion of specific performance to unique goods or "other proper circumstances").
'In a Coasean world with no transactions costs, the remedy will be immaterial from an effi-
ciency perspective-the parties will bargain to the efficient remedy in any case.
4See UCC § 2-716(1) (proposed revision 2005) (stating that "specific performance may be
decreed if the parties have agreed to that remedy"). See also Alan Schwartz, The Myth that
Promisees Prefer Supercompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Mea-
sures, 100 Yale L.J. 369, 387-89 (1990) (discussing whether contractually specified specific per-
formance should be enforced by the courts).
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beef producer in the United States) to create the "nation's leading protein
provider."5 Tyson subsequently attempted to terminate the acquisition,
despite IBP's wish to continue, claiming that some developments in IBP's
business violated IBP's warranties and triggered a material adverse change
(MAC) clause in the merger agreement. The conflict ended in the Delaware
Chancery Court (interpreting New York law). In an important opinion, the
Chancery Court rejected Tyson's arguments. 6 More importantly (for the pur-
poses of this study), the Chancery Court awarded the unusual remedy of spe-
cific performance. 7 Tyson was required to merge with IBP according to the
original terms of the agreement.
8
This article examines the stock market consequences of this event. In
a zero-transaction-costs world, the combined values of Tyson and IBP would
be unaffected by the decision or the choice of remedy. Before the decision,
the market would assume that the efficient performance/nonperformance
decision would be reached regardless of the court's ruling. As a result, the
court's ruling would not affect the "size of the pie" available to Tyson or IBP,
but only the distribution of the pie between the two companies. Following
the court's ruling, the winner's value should increase and the loser's should
decrease by equal amounts; the combined value of the two companies should
remain the same.
In a world with positive transaction costs, however, the Chancery
Court's choice of remedy matters. If completion of the merger is the effi-
cient outcome, then specific performance will be the preferred remedy.
Damages might be undercompensatory, and bargaining difficulties might
preclude an efficient merger if such were not mandated. If damages were
high enough, then they also might threaten the financial stability of Tyson,
at great cost to the combined value of the two companies. In these contexts,
specific performance should raise the combined value of Tyson and IBP by
increasing the size of the pie. By contrast, if noncompletion of the merger
51n re IBP Sholders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 31 (Del. Ch. 2001) [hereinafter IBP].
61d.
7One law firm described the specific performance remedy as a "very unusual result." Vedder
Price Kaufman & Kamholz, Corporate M&A Advisor (2001), available at <http://www.
vedderprice.com/docs/pub/8e3d6360-ec07-4974-a9c9-Od44ec45bd30_document.pdf.>.
'See IBP, 789 A.2d 14.
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is the efficient option, then specific performance should destroy value by
compelling the dueling companies to conduct bargaining to avoid merging.
The IBPverdict offers a unique opportunity for studying the efficiency
of specific performance. Most commentators surveying the IBP litigation
agreed that damages were the most likely remedy.9 The market was most
likely surprised by the Chancery Court's specific performance award. More-
over, the verdict concerned a question-whether the merger would go
forward-that was quantitatively important for the value of both companies,
making it unlikely that the effects of the verdict on the companies' com-
bined value would be "lost" in the noise of ordinary stock market fluctua-
tions. Apparently, the surprise specific performance remedy was value
maximizing. After the Delaware Chancery Court's ruling and specific per-
formance award, the combined stock market value of Tyson and IBP rose by
a statistically significant 5 percent (relative to the market index) within one
day of trading. The increase in value persisted after three days, although
results are no longer as statistically significant. Tyson and IBP signed a
revised agreement to combine shortly after the decision, at terms similar
(but slightly more favorable to Tyson) to those in the original contract. ° As
explained below, the best explanation for the positive market reaction to the
decision is that the surprising specific performance award reduced the prob-
ability of bargaining breakdowns in a bilateral monopoly setting between two
hostile parties and mitigated principal-agent conflicts that might have
impeded an efficient merger.
Although the specific performance award in IBP was unusual, it was
not unique. For example, the IBP opinion cited a Third Circuit decision that
also ruled that specific performance was justified in the context of a MAC
clause litigation." To shed some light on the robustness of the value creation
caused by specific performance in MAC litigations, the stock market effects
of the Allegheny rulings are also studied. Although the precise questions
decided in Allegheny are different than those considered in IBP and the mag-
'See, e.g., Vedder Price, supra note 7 (describing the remedy as "very unusual"); What You Do
Know Can Hurt You, Corporate Control Alert, July 2001, at 12 (quoting a prominent attorney
stating that "I don't know of anyone who has ordered two companies to merge").
"See Tyson's Trial Tribulations, Corporate Control Alert, July 2001, at 17.
"Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 E3d 153 (3d Cir. 1999). See also Allegheny Energy,
Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 216 E3d 1075 (3d Cir. 2000); Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 74 F. Supp.
2d 482 (W.D.P.A. 1999).
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nitude and statistical significance of the effects are smaller, the general
pattern remains the same-specific performance awards add value. Other
remedies destroy value. Apparently, the market expects specific performance
to be granted more infrequently than efficiency would dictate and therefore
responds positively to surprising specific performance awards.
These findings have potentially important implications for the age-old
debate on contract remedies, although the limited sample size precludes any
firm conclusions. The common law's preference for money damages should
be viewed with heightened suspicion." At a minimum, the revised UCC's
attempts to enhance the availability of stipulated specific performance
awards should be encouraged.
The article proceeds as follows. Section II surveys the literature evalu-
ating contract remedies. Section III applies this literature to the IBP-Tyson
litigation to establish a context for evaluating the stock market responses to
various events over the course of the litigation. Section IV offers an "event-
study" analysis of the stock market responses to important events in the
IBP-Tyson merger. Section V interprets the findings and assesses their
implications for contract law.
II. CONTRACT REMEDIES
A. Theoretical Arguments
When breach is efficient-when the social surplus created by performance
is less than the surplus from breach-accurately calculated money damage
awards are superior to specific performance remedies. If damages always
equal the harm done to the promisee and courts never make errors in decid-
ing whether a contract has been breached, then a promisor will breach only
if the benefits from breaching exceed the harm caused to the promisee (as
reflected in the damage awards). In other words, the promisor will breach
only when breach is efficient. Several scholars praise damage awards for this
l2More generally, "property rule" protections may be more efficient than commonly realized
(and liability rule protections less so). See Guido Calabresi & A.D. Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1976). The
IBP case is an unusual setting in which to apply the "Cathedral" and post-Cathedral means of
analysis of remedies. The entitlement at stake in Tyson v. IBP, IBP's right to sell to Tyson at a
given price, is itself a form of "put option." Thus, the IBP-Tyson remedy also falls naturally
within the class of "put-option" liability rules described in Ian Ayres & Paul Goldbart, Optimal
Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2001).
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feature-by giving the promisor an option to perform or pay damages,
damage awards give the promisor the incentive to find the most efficient use
of resources, without having to incur the transaction cost of bargaining with
the promisee to obtain the promisee's approval."
When damages are not accurately calculated and parties do not
bargain costlessly to the efficient result, 4 however, damage awards give rise
to inefficiencies. Under these plausible assumptions, a promisor may breach
in spite of the fact that the value of performance to the promisee is greater
than the cost of performance to the promisor. The promisor will breach if
he or she believes the damages will be less than the costs of performance.
In a zero-transaction-costs world, performance will occur even with incorrect
damages, as the promisor and promisee will share the surplus from efficient
performance in any case. When transaction costs are greater than zero,
however, efficient performance may not happen in spite of its efficiency
(underperformance).15 Failures in bilateral monopoly bargaining resulting
from differing valuations, liquidity constraints, spite, and endowment effects
may make inefficient nonperformance a likely outcome when performance
is not compelled. 6 Even if efficient performance occurs in spite of these
obstacles, a damage remedy necessitates costly bargaining to attain the effi-
cient outcome.
Specific performance mitigates the underperformance problem. By its
very nature, specific performance enables the promisee to get the benefit of
his or her bargain.' 7 Because specific performance precludes an under-
compensatory damage award, it reduces the promisor's incentive to breach
when performance is efficient. As a result, a promisor has less incentive to
breach opportunistically.
1 See, e.g., Richard Posner, Economics Analysis of Law 130-35 (5th ed. 1998).
4A finding of no breach when breach has occurred (leading to no damages) is an extreme
form of inaccurate damages assessment.
"SIndeed, the parties have already failed at bargaining-or else trial would not have taken place.
Given this initial failure in bargaining, a subsequent bargaining failure appears likely.
'T6For evidence that the efficient result is not always obtained even when the number of parties
is small, see Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain AfterJudgment? A Glimpse
Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 373 (1999).
17Specific performance is also preferred by those who emphasize the moral dimensions of
breach as failure to keep a promise. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (1981).
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Specific performance, however, raises other transaction costs. When
breach is efficient, a specific performance award requires additional nego-
tiations to ensure that the optimal performance decision is undertaken. If
negotiations fail, then inefficient performance ensues. Fear of these "over-
performance costs" may explain why specific performance can be awarded
only at the court's discretion under common law. 8
This analysis suggests a general standard for choosing when to award
specific performance versus damages. When the risks of underperformance
are greater than the risks of overperformance, specific performance is the
preferred remedy because it induces more performance and lowers trans-
action costs. When the risks of overperformance are greater, then damages
are the better remedy because they prevent inefficient performance and
reduce associated transaction costs.
MAC provisions may be especially prone to cause underperformance
problems when bargaining is imperfect. As explained by Gilson and
Schwartz,19 the purpose of MAC provisions is to mitigate underinvestment
by the seller in a merger agreement during the postsigning/preclosing
period. The MAC clause mitigates the underinvestment problem by allow-
ing the buyer to exit the deal (and thereby hurting the seller) if certain mate-
rial adverse changes occur. Because underinvestment raises the probability
of the occurrence of a material adverse change, the MAC clause raises the
incentive of the seller to invest and thereby lowers the probability that the
MAC will be exercised.
MAC clauses mitigate underinvestment problems, but they raise the
risk of underperformance when bargaining is imperfect. Gilson and
Schwartz explain that, as a general matter, endogenous merger risk should
be placed on the seller and exogenous risk on the buyer.2" Because MACs
are written as standards and not as rules and are necessarily incomplete,
buyers may exploit MACs to renege on merger agreements that have become
unprofitable for the buyer due to exogenous changes in the value of the
"5The revised UCC (yet to be adopted by any state) enables the parties to a contract to stipu-
late specific performance. See Rev. UCC §2-716(1).
19See Ronald Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions
(2004), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=515105>. Note that Gilson and Schwartz assume
costless renegotiation. As a result, some of their conclusions differ from the ones made here.
"See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 29.
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combined companies-in spite of the fact that insuring the buyer against
such exogenous risk is not the purpose of the MACs.2" When bargaining and
courts are imperfect, the MAC, which terminates the deal, thus raises the
possibility of underperformance. In addition to the possibility of inadequate
damages, the MAC introduces the possibility of inadequate contract enforce-
ment due to the difficulties of interpreting MACs properly. Thus, MAC
clause litigation may be particularly conducive to specific performance
remedies.22
In IBP, the Delaware Chancery Court concluded that Tyson had
assumed the exogenous risk of the merger but was attempting to use the
MAC clause to exit the merger because a postagreement cyclical downturn
in the beef industry had reduced IBP's value.23 The Chancery Court noted
that the "notion that the [MAC clause] gave Tyson a right to walk away simply
because of a downturn [in the industry] is untenable. "24 The Chancery Court
emphasized that the CEO of Tyson had stated that Tyson was purchasing IBP
"fully aware of the cyclical factors that affect commodity meat products."
25
Although the court focused on other factors in finding that the MAC clause
was inapplicable, the court's reasoning suggests that Tyson was attempting
21Buyers might also threaten to call the MAC as a way of expropriating the seller's deal-specific
investments. When courts are imperfect and MACs are vaguely worded, a seller must be con-
cerned about the possibility of such holdups.
22This analysis implies a risk of underperformance when the buyer wins as well as when the
buyer loses. To mitigate this risk, a "spur" type of entitlement might be appropriate when
the buyer has successfully exercised the MAC clause. That is, when a buyer successfully exer-
cises MAC, the court should still compel a merger, but allow the seller to force a sale to the
buyer at a price lower than the one set out in the merger agreement. Alternatively, the buyer
should be allowed to press for specific performance rather than damages if it improperly exer-
cised the MAC. As one commentator noted, "IBP... could be cited by buyers finding them-
selves in situations similar to Tyson's even where the seller is seeking monetary damages. A
buyer could argue that it should be permitted to back out of a deal under the terms of the con-
tract and that, in the alternative, if the court determined that it does not have the right to walk
away, then specific performance should be the remedy." M&A Law., July 2001/August 2001,
at 19.
23See IBP, 789 A.2d at 47. For an extensive theoretical analysis of the IBP remedy, see Jordan
A. Goldstein, The Efficiency of Specific Performance in Stock-for-Stock Mergers, 29 Del.J. Corp.
L. 747 (2005).
241BP, 789 A.2d at 66.
21d. at 45 (quoting John Tyson, CEO of Tyson).
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to place exogenous risk on IBP.2 As a result, the Chancery Court ruled that
the merger agreement remained binding.
Instead of the damage remedy the market was apparently expecting,
the Chancery Court concluded that IBP was entitled to specific perform-
ance.27 At first glance, the Chancery Court's grant of specific performance
to IBP epitomizes the dangers of specific performance inducing overper-
formance. What could be more value destroying than forcing two hostile
management teams to merge their firms together? 28 In spite of this concern,
the Chancery Court ruled that specific performance was warranted because
of the difficulty of measuring damages accurately.2 9 Furthermore, the
Chancery Court noted that Tyson was still considering purchasing IBP at a
lower price and that Tyson's posttrial briefs failed to oppose specific
performance as a remedy, suggesting that a merger was not practically
impossible."0
The Chancery Court's reasoning may be interpreted in the context of
the theoretical framework just developed. First, the Chancery Court felt that
Tyson was inappropriately attempting to reassign exogenous risk by exercis-
ing the MAC. Second, the Chancery Court was concerned about mis-
estimation of damages. Third, the Chancery Court found no evidence that
the underlying logic of the merger had been changed by the downturn in
the industry. All these factors suggest that underperformance was a risk if
16Note that, unlike many MAC provisions, the ones at issue in Tyson did not include a long list
of exclusions that attempted to place exogenous risk on the buyer. As a result, Gilson and
Schwartz conclude that the Delaware Chancery Court's interpretation of the MAC in Tyson was
mistaken. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 44-45. Gilson and Schwartz also criticize
the Chancery Court's lack of emphasis on the endogenous versus exogenous risk question. The
positive stock market reaction, however, suggests that the Chancery Court may have reached
the right result and assignment of risks for the wrong reasons. The Chancery Court's remedy,
however, was chosen deliberately and correctly.
57
See supra note 9.
2
8Chancellor Strine recognized this concern. See IBP, 789 A.2d at 83. Chancellor Strine noted,
however, that once Tyson acquired IBP, it would be able to fire IBP management in the event
of difficulties. Id.
2IBP, 789 A.2d at 83-84.
nId. at 82. As the court noted, too much should not be read into this point. Tyson's briefs never
stipulated that specific performance was the appropriate remedy, nor did the briefs discuss any
other remedy. Thus, it is not clear that Tyson was satisfied with a specific performance remedy
in the event it failed to win the litigation.
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bargaining was imperfect. The original logic of the merger remained. To
mitigate the risks of underperformance and minimize bargaining costs, the
Chancery Court chose specific performance."' Was the Chancery Court's rea-
soning sound? The next section evaluates the stock market's verdict on the
Chancery Court's decision. Before presenting the results of this study, it is
important to examine the current state of the empirical evaluation of reme-
dies literature. This discussion provides some necessary context for the data
analysis that follows.
B. Empirical Evaluation of Remedies
No studies directly evaluate the efficiency of different remedies. Several
papers, however, examine the effects of litigation on valuation as a more
general matter. The results of these studies shed some light on the efficacy
of various remedies. Two prominent examples are the studies of the Texaco-
Pennzoil litigation conducted by Cutler and Summers and by Engerman and
Cornell.32 In this litigation, Pennzoil won a multibillion dollar damage award
from Texaco. Cutler and Summers examine the combined stock market
value reaction to the large damage award and find that the combined value
of the companies declined drastically. They attribute this "leakage" of value
to the costs of financial distress-although at first glance a damage award
simply redistributes value from one party to another, the large size of the
damage award raised the specter of bankruptcy for Texaco. This harmed
Texaco's relationships with many third parties, and apparently caused the
decline in combined valuation. Similar leakages of value as a result of finan-
cial distress have been found in other studies of intercorporate litigation."
What these studies do not mention is that the leakage in value is poten-
tially the result of the choice of remedy. If large damage awards had not
31
Even if the parties would have ultimately merged at an alternative price, specific performance
obviated the need for extended haggling over the revised terms of the deal.
3
2
David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Dis-
tress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 Rand J. Econ. 157 (1998); Kathleen
Engerman & Bradford Cornell, Measuring the Costs of Corporate Litigations: Five Case Studies,
17J. Legal. Stud. 377 (1988).
33
See Sanjai Bhagat, John Bizjak & Jeffrey Coles, The Shareholder Wealth Implications of Cor-
porate Lawsuits, 27 Fin. Mgmt. 5 (1998); Sanjai Bhagat, James A. Brickley &Jeffrey Coles, The
Wealth Effects of Interfirm Lawsuits: Evidence from Corporate Lawsuits, 35J. Fin. Econ. 221
(1994). Note that many of the results found in these studies concern the wealth effects of the
announcement of intercorporate lawsuits rather than the wealth effects of verdicts.
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been required, the defendants might not have suffered financial distress and
value would not have been destroyed.34 Thus, money damages, often con-
sidered the simplest and cheapest type of remedy, cause substantial loss of
value in some contexts. But we should not be too hasty to criticize damages
as a remedy; perhaps leakage is simply an inevitable cost of a plaintiff victory
at trial. If the cost of performance exceeds the cost of damages, then
damages should lead to no more financial distress than specific perform-
ance remedies.3 5
One explanation for the scarcity of studies on the impact of remedies
may be the relative rarity of decisions causing large changes in stock market
valuations. Without large changes in value, the event-study methodology
employed in such papers will be incapable of uncovering any effect of reme-
dies-if there is no event, there can be no event study. To illustrate, suppose
two publicly traded companies go to court over a contract with a value of
$10,000. Suppose further that a court imposes an inefficient specific per-
formance remedy, which causes a decrease in value of $5,000. In this case,
the decision should cause a decrease in combined value of $5,000 for the
two companies. Given the standard "noisy" fluctuations in stock prices,
however, such a small effect on the combined value will be imperceptible. A
study of this event would probably conclude that the specific performance
verdict has no impact on combined value, in spite of the remedy's
inefficiency.
36
'This consideration is particularly relevant with respect to Texaco and Pennzoil. In this litiga-
tion, the damages imposed on Texaco far exceeded most estimates of the benefit of perform-
ance to Pennzoil. As a result, specific performance, unlike damages, would not have threatened
financial distress to nearly the same degree.
3 5
There is no doubt that damages estimation is more uncertain than specific performance. As
a result, damages may be more likely to lead to outsize remedies that threaten the defendant's
existence. For example, many scholars consider the damages award determined by the jury in
the Texaco-Pennzoil litigation to be flawed and overly generous. See Cutler & Summers, supra
note 32, at 158-59. Specific performance would have mitigated the value-destroying financial
distress caused by the excess generosity of the jury's damages award.
'This concern helps explain the emphasis placed upon the Texaco-Pennzoil case studies con-
ducted by Summers and Cutler, supra note 32 and Engermann and Cornell, supra note 32,
which are frequently cited for the proposition that financial distress destroys value, in spite of
the difficulty of generalizing from a single case study. See, e.g., Bhagat et al., supra note 33.
The Texaco-Pennzoil litigation caused large fluctuations in the value of both companies. Con-
sequently, changes in the combined value of both companies can be identified more plausibly
than in other cases with smaller stakes.
480 The Empirical Case for Specific Performance
III. How TO EVALUATE THE STOCK PRICE REACTION
TO THE DELAWARE CHANCERY COURT'S DECISION
Without evidence on the impact of specific performance on stock market
valuations, a thorough empirical assessment of specific performance and
damages is impossible. The IBP-Tyson merger litigation offers an unusually
straightforward window for evaluating specific performance in action.
Because the merger was a high-stakes event for both companies, decisions
concerning the merger caused large fluctuations in stock prices, thereby
facilitating the identification of the efficiency of specific performance.
The Chancery Court felt that specific performance was the appropri-
ate remedy in IBP, but the court may well have been wrong. The stock
market, however, is unlikely to have systematic biases in favor of one remedy
over another.37 The Chancery Court's decision yielded two pieces of infor-
mation to the market, namely, (1) that IBP won the litigation, and (2) that
the remedy would be specific performance. The first piece of information
should cause the value of IBP to go up and the value of Tyson to go down,
but should not lead to any change in the combined value of the two com-
panies-it concerns the distribution of the "pie" (the pie being the total
value of the two companies) rather than the size of the pie. The second piece
of information, however, affects the size of the pie. In a world with costly bar-
gaining, specific performance raises the probability of a merger and lowers
the probability of a large damages payment. If the market concludes that
this change in probabilities raised the expected profit streams from the two
companies, then the combined values of the two companies should rise. If
these changes destroyed value-a plausible assumption given the nature of
the forced merger and the general trend toward "leakage" of value after
plaintiff victories in intercorporate litigation-then the stock market
response should be negative.
To better understand the impact of the IBP verdict on the combined
value of IBP and Tyson, I have developed a simple model of the stock market
response to the Delaware Chancery Court's specific performance decision.
A. Variables
Let VT' and V' be the total stock market values of Tyson and IBP, respec-
tively, before the decision is made. Let VT"° and V1JD be the total stock market
"7According to the efficient-markets hypothesis, the stock market will efficiently value the
change in expected profit streams caused by the decision and alter the value of Tyson and IBP
accordingly.
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values of Tyson and IBP, respectively, after the decision is made. Let Vrs and
V1,sp be the values of Tyson and IBP, respectively, if specific performance (a
required merger) is imposed on the two companies and let VT,NSp and VNsP
be the values of Tyson and IBP (exclusive of damages), respectively, if spe-
cific performance is not imposed." This highlights the fact that both a Tyson
victory and an IBP victory with a damages award allocate similar bundles of
rights-absent further negotiation, Tyson and IBP will not merge under
either decision. If Tyson wins, its total value is VTNsp A Tyson victory and an
IBP victory with a damage award differ in a distributional sense. Tyson will
be worth less and IBP worth more if the court rules for IBP because of the
impact of the damage payment. Thus, let DT be the cost of a damage award
to Tyson and let DI be the value of a damage award to IBP. If Tyson loses the
litigation and is forced to pay damages, its value is VT, - DT-the only dif-
ference between this value and Tyson's value if it wins is the requirement to
pay damages of DT. Finally, let aT be the probability that Tyson wins at trial
(i.e., the court finds no breach of contract). The Chancery Court's acknowl-
edgment that the question was a close one suggests that aT should be near
0.5. Let qD be the probability that the court will award damages, given that
it finds for IBP. Given the common-law preference for damages rather than
specific performance, qD should be high (near one)."
The value of Tyson and IBP on the day before the decision is a weighted
average of the value of each company under any of the decision possibili-
ties. Thus arise the equations set out in the next subsection.
B. Stock Market Valuations
VTD = a TVTNSP + (1 - a T)[qD (VTNSP - DT) + (1 - qD)VTsP]
VI
B
D - aTVINSP + (1 - aT)[qD(VI,NSP + D,) + (1 - qD)VsP].
After the decision, the market's uncertainty is resolved. The market no
longer has to account for the possibility of a Tyson victory or an IBP victory
with a damages award. The values are thus:
'This model assumes that the probability of a Type 4 decision-a Tyson victory coupled with a
forced merger-was near zero. Given the rarity of such decisions, this appears to be a plausi-
ble assumption.
'Recall that the specific performance remedy was described as "very unusual." See Vedder
Price, supra note 7.
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V" = V ,sP
VAD = V, sp.
The change in the combined stock market value as a result of the decision is:
(VTD + V," - (vrD + VBD) = (a,, + qD - a7+D)[(VTSP + - (VTNSP + V,NSP)]
+ (qo - arqD)[DT - D,]. (1)
C. What the Stock Price Movements Tell Us
Equation (1) is the primary quantity of interest in the empirical analysis
below. Note that in a Coasean-no-transactions-cost world, (VT + V) =
(VNsp + V,NSp) because the parties will bargain costlessly around the court's
decision to arrive at the efficient result. Moreover, DT = DI, the cost of the
damages award to Tyson, is the same as the benefit of the damages award to
IBP. Therefore, in a Coasean world the combined value of Tyson and IBP
should be unchanged by the verdict.
When transactions costs are nonzero, the verdict matters for the com-
bined value of the two companies. An increase in the combined value after
the merger reflects the market's opinion that the value of the two compa-
nies is greater when specific performance is dictated than under other out-
comes. The combined values of the two companies will tend to rise after a
specific performance remedy if (VT,sp + Vsp) > (VT,NSP + VNSp). This inequal-
ity will hold if the merger is the efficient outcome. When the merger is effi-
cient, specific performance precludes bargaining failures that may foil the
merger if the merger is not required. Alternatively, specific performance
economizes on transaction costs that must follow a damages award in order
for the parties to renegotiate a merger. In addition, the specific perform-
ance award will tend to increase value if DT > DI. If the cost of the damages
award to Tyson is greater than the value of the damages award to IBP, then
specific performance will raise value by avoiding the value destroying
damages award. The costs and benefits of damages awards will tend to
diverge when a firm's financial position is placed at risk by damages awards
but not by performance. As explained below, these conditions are unlikely
to apply in the IBP-Tyson context. Thus, an increase in combined stock value
is best explained by an increase in the probability of an efficient merger.
When a nonmerger is the efficient outcome, by contrast, specific per-
formance raises the possibility of overperformance and requires additional
negotiations. Thus, the combined stock price will tend to decline after a spe-
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cific performance award if nonmerger is the efficient outcome because (V;sp
+ V, sp) < ( VTNsp + VINsp), making Equation (1) more likely to be negative.
Finally, note that the changes in individual and combined stock market
value after the decision will be higher when qo is higher, other things equal.
Large postdecision changes in value for Tyson and IBP will provide some evi-
dence for the assertion that the specific performance remedy was a surprise
to the market.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
A. Market Response to Events in the Tyson-IBP Litigation
To examine the stock market response to specific performance, the event
study focuses on specific performance verdicts relating to merger activity
between two publicly traded companies. Mergers and acquisitions are typi-
cally high-stakes events, causing large fluctuations in the market value of the
companies involved. Extensive searches on the Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw data-
bases revealed only two cases mentioning specific performance in the
context of merger litigation verdicts. These cases are IBP and Allegheny. a0 Of
these two cases, only the IBP verdict ruled on both the merits of the oppos-
ing parties' arguments and the appropriate remedy on the same date.4 1 Con-
sequently, the IBP verdict should cause larger stock price fluctuations,
thereby facilitating identification of specific performance's efficiency.
Data on Tyson and IBP stock prices and market valuations was obtained
from CRSP. The responses of the separate valuations, as well as the com-
bined valuation of the two companies, were examined in relation to impor-
tant events concerning the merger and the subsequent litigation. The
"events" are as follows.42
4 See IBP, 789 A.2d 14; Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
4 1Compare IBP, 789 A.2d 14 with Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 E3d 153 (3d Cir.
1999); Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 216 F.3d 1075 (3d Cir. 2000); Allegheny Energy,
Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 74 E Supp. 2d 482 (W.D.P.A. 1999).
42Each event date is the first market trading day in which the information was available. This
information was obtained by reading through Chancellor Strine's opinion, news accounts of
the trial, and comparing the dates listed there with market trading days (in some cases, the first
news available to the market became available on weekends, so the event date is the Monday
following the release of the information). On each event date, trading volumes in both
company's shares were extremely high, suggesting that important new information was avail-
able to the market.
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1. On March 29, 2001, the market learned that Tyson terminated its
merger agreement with IBP, claiming that IBP had violated the
merger agreement by not disclosing some accounting irregularities
at an IBP subsidiary, and requesting damages from IBP. IBP coun-
tersued in the Delaware Chancery Court, seeking specific perform-
ance of the merger agreement.
43
2. On June 18, 2001, the market learned of the Delaware Chancery
Court's decision that the merger agreement was binding on Tyson
and that IBP was entitled to specific performance.44
3. On June 28, 2001, the two parties signed a revised merger agree-
ment for terms slightly more favorable to Tyson than the original
merger agreement.
45
The analysis focuses on the Chancery Court's June 18 decision, which bears
most directly on the efficiency of specific performance in this context.
Table 1 presents the individual and combined stock market abnormal
returns in response to these events. The abnormal returns and standard errors
presented in parentheses in Table 1 are calculated according to standard
event-study methodology.46 The efficient-market hypothesis suggests that the
one-day abnormal returns are the best measure of the effects of the litigation.
Because Tyson's pursuit of IBP unfolded over a relatively long period
of time, there is no one obvious event date on which to examine the stock
market's opinion of the initial merger between Tyson and IBP Although
"See IBP, 789 A.2d at 51.
'See Tyson's Trial Tribulations, supra note 10, at 13-17.
"Id. at 17.
'For discussions of this methodology, see Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and
the Law: Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 Am. L. Econ. Rev. 141 (2002) [here-
inafter Bhagat & Romano I]; Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law:
Part II: Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 Am. L. Econ. Rev. 380 (2002). The statistical
market model forming the basis of the study was calculated using the 100-trading-day period
that ended 30 days before the announcement of the first takeover bid for IBP. See Bhagat &
Romano I, at 146-47. Because of the likelihood of covariance between the abnormal return of
Tyson and that of IBP during the litigation period, the standard errors of the abnormal returns
for the combined value of Tyson and IBP were calculated treating Tyson and IBP as the com-
ponents of a single portfolio. The standard errors of the abnormal returns listed in the "com-
bined value" columns of Table 1 are the standard errors of the abnormal return for this
portfolio. See A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35J. Econ. Lit. 13,
27 (1997).
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Table 1: Stock Price Effects of IBP-Tyson Litigation Events
1-Day Abnormal Return 3-Day Abnormal Return
Expressed as a Percentage of Expressed as a Percentage of
Initial Value (Standard Errors Initial Value (Standard Errors
in Parentheses) in Parentheses)
Combined Combined
Event Tyson IBP Value Tyson IBP Value
1. Tyson announces it is 16.8* -28.4* -5.2* 15.9* -36.1" -8.6
reneging (March 29, (2.7) (2.5) (2.1) (8.1) (7.5) (6.3)
2001)
2. DE Chancery Court -17.4* 33.2* 4.6* -15.3 32.9* 5.4
decision (June 18, 2001) (2.7) (2.5) (2.1) (8.1) (7.5) (6.3)
3. Tyson and IBP announce 3.2 3.3 3.3 4.3 4.0 4.2
a merger (2.7) (2.5) (2.1) (8.1) (7.5) (6.3)
NOTE: Each cell in the table presents the "abnormal" percentage change in stock market value
(as a percentage of initial value) of Tyson, IBP, or the combined value of Tyson + IBP on the
event dates listed in the first cell of each row. The first group of numerical cells in each row
presents the abnormal return on the first day after the event. The second group of numerical
cells gives the cumulative abnormal return three days after the event. The standard error of
each estimate is presented in parentheses below the estimate. The abnormal returns and stan-
dard errors are estimated using the "market model" described in Bhagat and Romano I (see
note 46). An asterisk indicates that the estimate is significant at the 95 percent level.
long horizons are exceedingly difficult to examine using the event-study
methodology,4 7 the combined stock market performance of Tyson and IBP
during the premerger-announcement period hints that the merger was effi-
cient. Over the three-month period that culminated in the announcement
of the IBP-Tyson merger, the combined value of Tyson and IBP rose by 37
percent. Over this same period, the DowJones Industrial Average declined
by 1.7 percent.
When Tyson announced the termination of the merger agreement, the
prices of Tyson and IBP moved in dramatically different directions. On the
first trading day with information about termination, Tyson's value rose by
almost 17 percent, whereas IBP's value fell by more than 28 percent. IBP's
three-day fall in value was an even more dramatic 36 percent. The large
changes in value for each company indicate that the market was surprised
by the termination of the merger. Clearly, the market was pleased that Tyson
was exiting the deal, and unhappy that IBP might no longer fetch a high
47See Bhagat & Romano I, supra note 46, at 150-51.
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price. The combined value of the two companies fell by a statistically signif-
icant 5.2 percent on the day of the announcement and by a total of 8.6
percent in the first three trading days after the termination of the agree-
ment. The cause of this decline in combined value is less clear, and will be
discussed below.
After Chancellor Strine ruled for IBP and awarded specific perform-
ance, the value of Tyson decreased by a statistically significant 17 percent
and the value of IBP rose by more than 33 percent. Again, the dramatic
changes in value indicate that the decision and choice of remedy yielded
new and surprising information to the market. Note the inverse relationship
between these stock market responses and those following Tyson's termina-
tion of the merger agreement. The magnitudes of the stock prices' move-
ments are very similar on both days, but the directions of the price
movements are reversed. Apparently, whatever was lost or gained by Tyson's
decision to terminate the merger was unwound by specific performance.
Tyson's value apparently decreased because of the market's dismay that it
would have to pay a high price for IBP. Conversely, the market was enthused
at the high price that IBP would receive on account of the decision.
Most surprisingly, the combined value of Tyson and IBP rose by a sta-
tistically significant 4.6 percent on the day of the decision and by 5.4 percent
over a three-day window. 48 Again, this is a near inversion of the combined
value's response to the termination of the merger. In a Coasean world, these
responses should not have occurred. Although the events under study will
change the distribution of value between the two companies, the efficient
outcome should occur through bargaining regardless of the allocation of
rights, leading to no change in the combined value. The statistically signifi-
cant responses of the combined values of the stock to these events strongly
refute the Coasean prediction.
The increase in value following the Chancery Court's decision implies
that the stock market viewed IBP's victory and the imposition of specific per-
formance in a positive light (relative to the possibility of a Tyson victory or
an IBP victory with a damages award) and the companies' combined value
rose accordingly.49 The model above suggests two reasons for the increase.
4 The three-day estimated rise of 5.4 percent is not significant at the 95 percent level due to
the higher standard errors associated with estimates over this extended timeframe.
4 Because there were (at least) three possible litigation outcomes (Tyson victory, IBP victory
with damages, IBP victory with specific performance), it may be that specific performance was
Listokin 487
First, the combined value could increase because of a change in the proba-
bility of an efficient merger or a reduction in the transactions costs associ-
ated with merging.5" (VTsp + V1,sp) > (VTusp + VINSp). Second, the combined
value could increase because of the reduction of the probability that
Tyson would be forced to make a large damages payment that caused value-
destroying financial distressS-implying that DT > D. Note that both these
explanations suggest that specific performance is a superior remedy to
damages. Whatever the explanation, the market preferred specific perfor-
mance to damages.
It is unlikely that value-destroying financial distress would result from
a damages award in this context. Value-destroying financial distress occurs
when a company's equity cushion is reduced to a small enough level to
threaten insolvency. For example, in the Texaco-Pennzoil litigation, the
damages award of almost $12 billion awarded to Pennzoil exceeded the value
of Texaco's equity ($8.5 billion) before the litigation was filed. Clearly, the
damages award imposed on Texaco was sufficient to place Texaco in finan-
cial distress.5 2 The same cannot be said regarding the IBP-Tyson litigation,
however. The difference between IBP's value under the merger contract and
its lowest value after Tyson terminated the merger agreement was approxi-
preferable to only one of the other outcomes. Note, however, that the difference between the
other two outcomes is merely distributional-the firms are under no obligation to merge in
either case. As a result, it is unlikely that the combined value of the two firms would vary greatly
depending on whether Tyson won or IBP won and damages were awarded. The critical ques-
tion for the combined valuations of the two firms was the choice of remedy. The individual val-
uations, of course, do vary depending on the outcome of the litigation.
50But perhaps the combined value increased simply because the market was relieved that IBP
won the litigation rather than the choice of remedy. This hypothetical must be developed
further to make any sense. Why would an IBP victory in and of itself matter for the combined
value of the two firms? Without more, victory just concerns the distribution of the pie rather
than the size of the pie. Only if an IBP victory led to some result that increases the size of the
pie should the combined value increase.
5 Another possibility is that the decision reduced the uncertainty surrounding the two firms.
Because the trial was expedited, however, the market could not have been surprised to receive
a decision. Thus, the uncertainty explanation must hinge on the presumption that uncertainty
is reduced more by specific performance than by damages.
5
2See also Bhagat, Brickley & Coles, supra note 33, at 233-42 (showing that the costs of litiga-
tion are higher when the defendant is in greater financial distress).
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mately $1.4 billion." At the time of the court's decision, Tyson's value was
more than $2.5 billion. Under almost any conceivable damages award, Tyson
would have retained a significant equity cushion. Furthermore, under spe-
cific performance, Tyson's offer (which allowed IBP shareholders to
exchange their shares for cash)54 also needed to be financed. The fact that
the market did not impose a financial distress penalty on the combined value
of the two firms at the time of the merger also suggests that Tyson had ample
cushion to finance the acquisition. If Tyson had enough of a cushion to
finance the acquisition at a high price without experiencing a large finan-
cial distress penalty, then Tyson also was likely to be able to finance a
damages award payment without undergoing undue financial distress."
Finally, the market price of Tyson debt was hardly affected by events related
to the merger litigation. On the first day of trading following the Chancery
Court's decision, the value of one Tyson unsecured note5 6 changed by only
0.03 percent, strongly suggesting that the bond market did not view the
Chancery Court's decision as a reprieve from financial distress.
This analysis (and the inverse symmetry of the stock price movements
between the termination of the merger and the specific performance award)
suggests that the increase in stock market value is most likely the result of
an increase in the probability of a value-enhancing merger. Moreover, the
market response to the events in the IBP-Tyson saga follows the general ten-
dencies for mergers and acquisitions as uncovered by several studies.5 7 These
"The market value of IBP, of course, included the potential that IBP would win the litigation.
Thus, damages could have been even higher that $1.4 billion. Note, however, that Tyson's value
included the possibility that it might lose the litigation. Thus, the value of its assets (without
any claims by IBP) was greater than $2.5 billion.
54See IBP, 789 A.2d at 40.
5 Specific performance precluded the possibility of an egregious damages award. Because the
case was before a judge in the Delaware Chancery Court rather than a jury, the chance of an
egregiously high damages award was probably reduced. As a result, it is unlikely that the market
was greatly concerned about the possibility of an egregious damages award that would be suf-
ficiently high to threaten Tyson's solvency.
'The price of Tyson's unsecured 6.75 percent coupon-rate notes (CUSIP No. 902494AA1) went
from $98.49 on June 15 to $98.52 on June 18.
5'See, e.g., Gregg Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffrey M. Netter, The Market for Corporate
Control: The Evidence Since 1980, 2J. Econ. Perspectives 49 (1988); Elazar Berkovitch & M.P
Narayanan, Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical Investigation, 28J. Fin. & Quantitative Analy-
sis 347 (1993).
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studies typically find an increase in value to the target, a decrease in value
for the acquirer, and an increase in combined value. This pattern is often
interpreted to mean that mergers and acquisitions increase value.
Specific performance raised the probability of an efficient merger
(mitigating underperformance problems) for several reasons. Tyson and IBP
confronted a bilateral monopoly bargaining problem. Both parties had
undertaken investments specific to the merger that could not be recouped
if the merger failed to go forward. It is well known that bilateral monopoly
bargaining problems often do not end in efficient solutions.5 8 This particu-
lar bilateral bargaining problem would be particularly unlikely to end with
efficient cooperation. The fact that Tyson and IBP chose to settle their dif-
ferences in court rather than through negotiations suggests that each party's
view of its rightful share of the total surplus differed substantially from the
other side's impression. In such circumstances, a negotiated solution
becomes less attainable-the parties' differences of opinion over their shares
of the pie make them unable to increase the size of the total pie. Moreover,
the court battle contributed to considerable hostility between Tyson and IBP
management. Finally, Tyson management may have had a vested interest in
declining a merger if it was not required to merge. Tyson management was
already subject to question for having decided to purchase IBP and then
trying to exit the agreement. To subsequently attempt to acquire IBP again
after a victory at trial or a loss with a damages award remedy (even at a dif-
ferent price) would have subjected Tyson management to considerable crit-
icism. Similarly, IBP management might have been reluctant to accept a new
merger agreement with their adversaries in court without a mandate to do
so. These complexities resulting from a bilateral monopoly between Tyson
and IBP might have prevented an efficient merger from going forward
outside a mandate.59
'See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 293,
307 (1992) (arguing that "bilateral monopoly markets are inherently inefficient and prone to
produce much bargaining and failed transactions").
59Tyson was a family-controlled company involving two generations of the Tyson family. Don
Tyson controlled many of the shares of the company and was very influential with the board of
directors, while his son,John, was Tyson's CEO. Don Tyson was against the IBP aquisition, while
John was in favor. See IBP, 789 A.2d at 23, 40. Because of Don's influence, Tyson, Inc. sought
to disentangle the merger. Once the merger was compelled, however, John's day-to-day control
over the company raised the probability that the merger would not fall victim to lingering
bitterness.
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Specific performance, of course, also raises the probability of an inef-
ficient merger going forward. It is extremely unlikely, however, that IBP man-
agement would request specific performance rather than damages if specific
performance were undesirable. Specific performance raised the distinct pos-
sibility that Tyson management would fire IBP management upon acquiring
IBP It is unlikely that IBP management would risk this possibility if per-
formance would be inefficient or damages fully compensatory. In addition,
Tyson's failure to mount a forceful argument against specific performance
implies that specific performance did not introduce a strong possibility of
overperformance. The market's positive reaction to specific performance
confirms that overperformance was not a salient concern.
B. Evidence from the Allegheny-DQE MAC Litigation
The IBP-Tyson litigation may be a unique event. To explore whether
these results are anomalous, I examine another MAC-related litigation
that occurred between DQE, Inc. (DQE) and Allegheny Energy, Inc.
(Allegheny), two publicly traded Pennsylvania electric utilities.6" After DQE
and Allegheny agreed to merge, some unfavorable regulatory rulings sig-
nificantly reduced Allegheny's value. DQE invoked the MAC clause of the
merger agreement and terminated the deal. Allegheny sued. Allegheny
requested a specific performance remedy and a preliminary injunction
requiring the merger to go forward. In an unpublished opinion, a federal
district court denied Allegheny's preliminary injunction motion, finding that
damages would be an adequate remedy and that therefore a preliminary
injunction was not warranted.61
Allegheny appealed. The Third Circuit remanded the district court's
decision, finding that damages would be an inadequate remedy for
Allegheny, and instructed the district court to evaluate other "factors" to
determine whether a preliminary injunction was warranted.6" The Third
'See Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 E3d 151 (1999). See also Joseph Slobodzian,
Business Watch, Nat'l L.J., March 29, 1999, at B2.
61See Allegheny Energy, 171 F.3d at 157.
6 The Third Circuit applies a four-factor test in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunc-
ion. The four factors are: "(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of
success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief;
(3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party;
Listokin 491
Circuit's decision thus raised the probability of a specific performance
remedy. Note, however, that the Third Circuit's decision did not offer a great
deal of information regarding the eventual victor of the MAC clause litiga-
tion, as it was specifically directed toward remedies. Consequently, it is not
surprising that the magnitudes of the changes in the individual and com-
bined values as a result of the decision are considerably smaller than in IBP.
In a later trial, the district court found that DQE had properly invoked
the MAC clause to terminate the merger agreement.63 The Third Circuit
affirmed this decision.6" These decisions lowered the probability of a merger,
since they required a renegotiation of terms before the merger could go
forward.
Table 2 presents the stock market response to important events in this
litigation. Table 2 should be interpreted cautiously. The magnitudes of the
changes in value caused by litigation events are considerably smaller than
those in IBP. In addition, the direction of the effects of some of the changes
is surprising. For example, DQE's value shrinks after some decisions that
appear to favor DQE over Allegheny. This suggests that the market antici-
pated the decisions to a much greater degree than in IBP. As a result, the
statistical significance of these results is considerably lower than the results
presented in Table 1.
Nevertheless, the results in Table 2 are consistent with the notion that
the DQE-Allegheny merger was a value-enhancing merger that was more
likely to occur with specific performance. The Third Circuit decision stating
that damages were an inadequate remedy raised the probability of a specific
performance remedy. The market responded positively to this ruling (Table
2, Row 1), with the combined value of the two companies going up by 0.65
percent (although the gains in value were not sustained over a three-day
window). The market response to the district and circuit court decisions in
favor of DQE (Table 2, Rows 2 and 3), which reduced the probability of a
merger, were generally either neutral or negative. In particular, the market
initially responded quite negatively to the Third Circuit's opinion affirming
and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest." Allegheny Energy,
171 F.3d at 157 (internal citations omitted). The district court decided on the basis of Factor
2, and the Third Circuit instructed the district court to weigh the other factors as well.
3See Allegheny Energy, 74 F. Supp. 2d 482.
"4See Allegheny Energy, 216 F.3d 1075.
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Table 2: Stock Price Effects of Allegheny-DQE Litigation Events
1-Day Abnormal Return 3-Day Abnormal Return
Expressed as a Percentage of Expressed as a Percentage of
Starting Value (Standard Starting Value (Standard
Error in Parentheses) Error in Parentheses)
Combined Combined
Event DQE Allegheny Value DQE Allegheny Value
1. Third Circuit opinion 0.44 0.81 0.65 -1.9 0.37 -0.67
supporting specific (1.1) (1.2) (0.95) (3.3) (3.6) (2.8)
performance
2. District court opinion in 0.64 0.13 0.37 -1.6 -1.4 -1.5
favor of DQE (1.1) (1.2) (0.95) (3.3) (3.6) (2.8)
3. Third Circuit affirmation -1.4 -2.5* -2.0* -0.3 1.5 0.6
of district court (1.1) (1.2) (0.95) (3.3) (3.6) (2.8)
NOTE: Each cell in the table presents the "abnormal" percentage change in stock market value
(as a percentage of initial value) of Allegheny, DQE, or the combined value of Allegheny +
DQE on the event dates listed in the first cell of each row. The first group of numerical cells
in each row presents the abnormal return on the first day after the event. The second group
of numerical cells gives the abnormal return three days after the event. The standard error of
each estimate is presented in parentheses below the estimate. The abnormal returns and stan-
dard errors are estimated using the "market model" described in Bhagat and Romano I (see
note 46). An asterisk indicates that the estimate is significant at the 95 percent level.
the district's court's decision in favor of DQE. Again, these results are broadly
consistent with the notion that the merger was efficient. Decisions that
lowered the probability of a merger without extensive negotiations lowered
(or did not change) the combined value of the companies, suggesting that
a merger was efficient. At the very least, there is no evidence in the DQE-
Allegheny litigation to suggest that specific performance was inefficient.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATION
Several tentative conclusions follow from the results presented here. Of
course, all these conclusions must be treated with the appropriate "grain of
salt"-one or two examples cannot prove anything. Nevertheless, one or two
examples are better than none.
The IBP-Tyson conflict sheds light on the revised UCC's provisions
regarding the stipulation of specific performance by contract. When the
parties stipulate specific performance, the parties must consider the risk allo-
cation and risk of underperformance entailed by the common-law prefer-
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ence for damages as inferior to the risks of overperformance caused by spe-
cific performance. The market's positive response to the IBP verdict follow-
ing Tyson's failure to mount a forceful case against specific performance
strongly suggests that an articulated preference for specific performance
should be respected because it is efficient. The revised UCC's provision for
specific performance should be applauded.
The positive market responses following the surprise pro-specific-
performance rulings in IBP and Allegheny suggest that specific performance
remedies are particularly appropriate to MAC clause litigations. As noted
above, there are reasons to believe that MAC clauses create unusually high
risks of underperformance. The event studies confirm that the market was
concerned about underperformance. To the extent that IBP and Allegheny
are typical MAC-clause litigations, these results suggest that courts should be
particularly willing tojettison the common-law preference for damages when
considering remedies for improper breaches of merger agreements
Finally, the contrast between the positive market response to the spe-
cific performance award in IBP and the negative market responses to
damages awards suggests that the general common-law preference for
damages over specific performance may be misguided. Neither remedy is
obviously better from a theoretical perspective. Instead, the choice of reme-
dies should be an empirical one. In IBP, the market expected a damages
remedy. When the market learned of specific performance, it responded
positively. This suggests that, at least in some contexts, the market expects
courts to grant damages remedies when specific performance is efficient. In
other words, the law may not be providing the efficient balance between
damages and specific performance remedies.
More empirical research regarding remedies is necessary to determine
if these results are robust. Ideally, each class of contract disputes will have
its own empirical investigation of the relative efficiency of both remedies. If
the empirical evidence consistently favors specific performance across many
different classes of contract disputes, a change in the default remedy may
be justified.

